INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with the efficiency properties of competition in a dynamic entry-deterrence framework. Consider a natural monopoly context, e.g. in which production involves large fixed costs. On the one hand, efficiency requires that a single firm operates. On the other hand, an unconstrained monopoly could adopt socially inefficient policies. Hence, an important issue is the extent to which the mere threat of entry by a competitor may ''discipline'' a monopoly and restore some efficiency without duplicating costs. Indeed, potential competition may force the incumbent to deviate from its optimal policy and instead adopt entry-preventing Ž . strategies for surveys see Gilbert, 1989; Wilson, 1992 . Such deviations reduce the incumbent's monopoly rent. In infinite horizon models of dynamic entry deterrence with symmetric firms, the no-entry condition Ž . takes the form of a simple recursive equation Wilson, 1992 : the incum-Ž . bent's optimal entry-preventing policy OEPP is such that its rival's entry cost equals the total discounted rent that the latter would earn after entering; this rent is itself determined by the OEPP that the new incumbent would have to follow. A rent dissipation property obtains; the recursive equation implies that the incumbent's total discounted rent is bounded so Ž that the flow profit has to go to zero as discounting decreases Farrell, . 1986 . The implications for efficiency are ambiguous, although, and have Ž . triggered most past developments Tirole, 1989 . Yet, an equally important issue is whether the competitive process selects the most efficient firm. To what extent can a historical incumbent deter entry by a more efficient competitor? Existing models cannot be used to tackle this question. They assume symmetric firms, which is key to formulating the rent dissipation argument. Despite their elegant simplicity, the direct technical extension of these approaches to asymmetric situations Ž . is not compelling. Eaton and Lipsey's 1980 's argument relies on an intuitive, rational expectations reasoning which loses its bite with asym-Ž . metric firms. Maskin and Tirole's 1988 's Markov equilibrium approach can lead to counterintuitive results; if the initial incumbent is the less efficient firm, it maintains indefinitely and earns the same rent as a more Ž . efficient firm would Lahmandi-Ayed et al., 1996 . Finally, Ponssard's Ž . 1991 's forward induction approach would require further refinements to handle the asymmetric case. To address this question, we thus resort to a finite horizon framework encompassing and extending the existing models. It builds on a finite series of Stackelberg stage games in which the leader's policy affects both its profit and its rival's entry cost. In dynamic settings, firms compete not only for the current demand but also for future incumbency and Stackelberg leadership. This is captured, under a reduced form, by endogenizing leadership; leadership in the next period's Stackel-berg game rests with the current period's incumbent unless entry occurs, in which case it accrues to the successful entrant. Finally, the logic of entry-barriers is the same as for symmetric games; in each stage, the incumbent's OEPP sets the rival's entry cost at the level of the future rent its rival would earn if it entered, became the new incumbent, and had to follow its own OEPP. The paper's central point is that the selection property of asymmetric games is the relevant economic extension to the rent dissipation property in symmetric ones, as well as its natural implication. The intuition is as follows. In the symmetric case, the incumbent's flow profit is driven down to zero by potential competition. In the asymmetric case, one firm has both a larger stage payoff for a given policy and a lower entry cost against a given policy. Under some sufficient assumptions on these functions, which we discuss, the less efficient firm's OEPP is more constrained than that of the more efficient one. Hence, its flow profit would have to be negative in the short-run so as to secure the positive incumbency rent earned in later stages. With a long horizon and low discounting, however, the losses accumulate to finally offset the future rent. Hence, the less efficient firm is better off exiting than preventing entry.
Although this analysis relies on a backward induction reasoning, it can be extended to some infinite horizon situations. As an illustration, a variant of the basic dynamic entry game is introduced in which firms are asymmetric during a finite phase, and then are symmetric forever. A similar selection property obtains. The analysis of this game is fruitful not only because it deals with a situation of economic relevance in which Ž . competitive dis advantages are only temporary. It also clarifies the role of our sufficient assumptions, providing an example in which the selection property holds under milder conditions. Dynamic symmetric entry games play a central role in the discussion of Ž . contestability issues Baumol et al., 1982; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1987 . The introduction of asymmetry significantly contributes to this debate as it allows us to analyze the competition process not only as a disciplinary mechanism but as a selection device. The selection property requires more stringent conditions than the rent dissipation property. This is illustrated Ž . by means of three examples adapted from Ponssard 1991 , Maskin and Ž . Ž . Tirole 1988 , and Eaton and Lipsey 1980 , in which entry is deterred through prices, capacities, and plant renewals. These examples also show that whether the selection property holds is bound to depend on the type of strategic variable considered.
The paper is organized as follows. The general framework is introduced in Section 2 and the main results are derived in Section 3. Section 4 applies this framework to the three examples. Section 5 concludes.
THE MODEL
We propose a model of dynamic competition between two firms in a natural monopoly context. In static Stackelberg entry games, the leader's policy tries to prevent entry by rivals in order to monopolize the demand. In dynamic entry games, the firms compete not just for the current demand but for future Stackelberg leadership as well, so as to monopolize future demand. Our model captures this double competition for demand and leadership in a reduced form. It is an extensive-form game of perfect information, consisting of a finite sequence of Stackelberg stage-games in which leadership is determined endogenously; leadership in the next period's Stackelberg game rests with the current period's incumbent unless entry occurs, in which case it accrues to the successful entrant. The game is diagrammed in Fig. 1 .
Ä 4 There are two firms indexed by i g 1, 2 . We consider games with a finite number of stages, N. For convenience, the stages are labelled Ž . backwards: N is played first, then stage N y 1 etc. In each stage, one firm is the leader. In the first stage, the leader is exogenous. In the other Ž . Ž. stages, it is determined endogenously see below . We denote by ⌫ i the N N-stage game in which firm i is the initial leader.
Suppose that firm 1 is the leader in stage n; it can choose to play ''In'' or ''Out.'' If firm 1 chooses ''In,'' both firms play the following Stackelberg Ž . Ž . game, G 1 see below . If firm 1 chooses ''Out,'' then firm 2 can choose Ž . between ''In'' and ''Out.'' If it chooses ''In'' the firms play G 2 . If both firms choose ''Out,'' they receive a payoff of zero in this stage and all remaining stages.
Ž . Game G i is played as follows. First, firm i chooses a policy x g X, i Ž . where X is an interval in R. Second, firm j with j / i chooses a policy Ä 4 x g Out, In . The payoffs¨and¨are as follows:
Ž . Each firm's total payoff in the game is the sum of all its stage payoffs. We derive all our results in this no-discounting setting. They must be interpreted as limit results for low discounting.
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These rules capture in a reduced form the features of competition for leadership underlying most existing models of entry deterrence. To focus the discussion, let us compare it to Maskin and Tirole's framework. In static models, two attributes characterize the Stackelberg leader. First, when the leader moves, its rival has not committed to a policy. Second, when its rival moves, the leader has already committed to a policy. By analogy, a Stackelberg leader in Maskin and Tirole's rigid timing structure is a firm which either does not face any commitment by its rival at its decision date, or it has already imposed its own capacity commitment when the latter has to move. How does leadership change hands? Although the follower faces a commitment by the leader, it must invest aggressively when called to move, so as to deter its opponent from counterinvesting at its next decision date. Then, when the current follower will move again, it will not face any commitment and will have become de facto leader. In this Ž . process, both firms share the market for at least one period with low price and profits, as a result of the follower setting up a large capacity to deter future entry. The current leader certainly loses money in the overlapping period. The industry profits can be depressed enough so that the follower loses money over its initial two-period commitment. It takes an entry cost to acquire leadership and future incumbency. As for the current leader, should it forego an investment opportunity, it will move two periods later. However, at this time, it will have become the follower, i.e. if its rival has invested in the meantime.
Our model accounts for a similar leadership contest story, yet condenses it within one stage. The leader at the outset of the period, firm i, can Ž . commit to a policy x e.g., price, quantity . If it operates as a monopoly, cost for firm j against x , i.e. the losses that the follower has to incur to i 1 In dynamic models, continuity at ␦ s 1 of both the policies and the payoffs is generally Ž problematic, as is the choice of an appropriate criterion in the undiscounted case see Dutta,
. 1991, for a general theory . In our setting, the problem is much more trivial. We mostly deal with finite horizon problems, in which policies and payoffs can be shown to be continuous in the discount factor, including at ␦ s 1, by a simple induction argument. We deal with infinite Ž . horizon only in the case of symmetric firms Section 3.1 and explicitly state an equivalence result between the limit of the discounted case and the undiscounted case. The continuity result is directly provided by the key recursive equation. Ä Ž .4 Ž . enter. It is a reduced form for min C x ; x , where X x is the
set of actions that allow firm j to enter against x .
i
The following assumptions are made.
Assumption A A. The functions¨,¨, C , and C are continuous on X.
Assumption B B. The functions¨and¨are strictly increasing on X.
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Assumption C C. The functions C and C are strictly decreasing on X.
Assumption A A involves no loss of generality. Assumptions B B and C C capture the idea that in order to build an entry barrier, the incumbent has to deviate from the policy of an unconstrained monopolist. Moreover, the higher the barrier, the greater the deviation and so the smaller the incumbent's profit. Consider, for instance, x as a price. The set X is the i set of prices below the unconstrained monopoly price. Hence, the incumbent's profit is increasing in the price it charges. Conversely, since an entrant has to undercut the incumbent's price to enter, the lower this price, the lower the entrant's short-term profit, i.e. the larger the entry cost. Assumption D D formalizes a very distinct property of our model; to raise its rival's entry cost by one unit, the incumbent has to reduce its own profit by less than one unit. In the subsequent analysis, this property is shown to be a sufficient condition for both the rent dissipation and the selection results.
Note that only the functions ''relative monotonicities'' matter. In some contexts, such as quantity competition, it is innocuous but more elegant to Ž . assume the opposite monotonicities, i.e.¨decreasing and C and C qï
THE MAIN RESULTS
The analysis is in two steps. First, we study the case of symmetric firms which have the same functions¨and C. Then, we examine a class of asymmetric entry games in which firms differ in their monopoly payoffs¨i and entry costs C . 
Ž .
2 However, as will be illustrated by some counterexamples, it is not a necessary condition.
The policy x l allows the firm operating as a monopoly to just break even. If the strategic variables are prices, x l is the monopolist's ''average cost
The policy x L is the largest x g X which, in the one-stage game, makes entry nonprofitable. Hence, by Assumption B B, x L is the optimal entrypreventing policy in a one-stage game. In terms of prices, x L is the ''static limit pricing '' policy. In what follows, we assume that x l and x L exist and satisfy
i.e., G i is played and x , and then firm j plays ''Out.'' Ž . In the N-stage game ⌫ i , entry is deterred by a dynamic entry-prevent-N ing policy that is a sequence of policies deterring entry in each stage of the game. The same firm maintains throughout the game. Its OEPP
, . . . , x is defined as the solution to
This definition extends the notion of a static entry barrier to a dynamic framework. In each stage, a firm's OEPP sets its rival's entry cost equal to the total incumbency rent that the latter would earn as the incumbent in subsequent stages. This rent itself is determined by the OEPP that the new incumbent would have to follow. The OEPP is thus determined by dynamic programming. Observe that an equivalent recursive equation for the OEPP is Ä n 4 Proof. We first prove by induction that the sequence x is well ng N* defined, is decreasing, and satisfies
3 The assumption that x l and x L exist is only a matter of simplicity and is innocuous. We
L is common to all static entry games; i.e., absent this assumption, entry barriers are impossible.
By the theorem of intermediate values, x 2 exists; it is unique by Assumption C C and satisfies
Step n q 1. Suppose that until rank n, the OEPP exists, is unique, and satisfies
As in
Step 1, x nq 1 exists, is unique, and satisfies
We now prove by induction on N that ⌫ i admits a unique perfect N equilibrium in which firm i maintains as incumbent with the OEPP
, . . . , x and therefore earns a total rent Ý¨x . The inducns 1 tion hypothesis is clearly satisfied for N s 1. Suppose that it holds until Ž . Ž . rank N and consider stage N q 1 in ⌫ i .
Nq1
Suppose that firm i plays ''In'' and
is maximized at x and that¨x ) 0. Suppose that firm i plays ''In'' and x ) x Nq 1 . Firm j enters because its
Conditionally on playing ''In,'' firm i's best strategy is to choose x Nq 1 and maintain. Ž . Suppose that firm i plays ''Out.'' Then G j is played and, by the previous argument, firm j plays ''In'' and x Nq 1 and its OEPP. It earns Corollary 1 shows that our finite horizon model is consistent with the infinite horizon models found in the literature. More precisely, the infinite Ž . horizon models Eaton and Lipsey, 1980; Maskin and Tirole, 1988 generate a stationary OEPP for each value of the discounting factor. As the Ž . discounting factor goes to 1 i.e., when cash flows are less discounted , the OEPP converges towards the policy such that stage payoffs equal zero. This constitutes the celebrated rent dissipation property. In our approach, in which the discounting factor is directly assumed to equal 1, the same policy obtains as the limit when the horizon goes to infinity. 4 The flow profit and therefore the average rent converge to zero. Note, however, that the total rent does not.
Notice that in some models the function¨may not satisfy Assumption Ž . B B on the entire range of values of x see Section 4.2 for an example . Moreover, it may be that x M , the optimal policy of an unconstrained monopoly, actually deters entry in the one-stage game. That is, the threat of entry does not constrain the monopolist's policy choice in the one-stage game. The incumbent's OEPP may be stationary at x M for short horizon games, but policies are constrained for longer horizons and the same monotonic convergence result is obtained when the horizon goes to infinity. 4 The convergence towards the solution of infinite horizon models is not due to the no-discounting assumption. It can be shown that for any discounting factor, the OEPP obtained in our finite horizon model converges to the stationary OEPP obtained in infinite horizon models. Indeed, in our approach, the limit of the OEPP has to solve a recursive equation which is precisely the fundamental recursive equation common to all infinite horizon models.
Asymmetric firms
Consider now the case of two firms with respective efficiency levels S Ž and W. Relative efficiency is captured by the following assumption per-. taining to functions .
Assumption E E states that for a given policy, the stage payoff of a strong firm is strictly greater than that of a weak firm. Furthermore, the entry cost against a given policy is smaller for a strong than for a weak firm.
S W
Indeed, the strong firm makes positive profits for policies that do not allow the weak one to break even. Moreover,
That is, preventing entry by the more efficient firm in the one-stage game Ž . requires a weakly more ''aggressive'' policy than preventing entry by the less efficient firm. Assuming x l -x L , the weak firm can profitably pre- The system which extends system 1 derived in the symmetric case is
This system is equivalent to the recursive system Step
Step n q 1. Suppose
Hence,
exists by the theorem of intermediate values.
Ž .
n Let M be the first rank possibly infinite at which x is not defined,
ii Consider now the case M -qϱ.
If the horizon is short enough, the weak firm can maintain and make positive profits in all stages. For longer horizons, in order to maintain, the weak firm has to incur negative profits in early stages, which are compensated by the positive profits in later stages. Lemma 2 states that for Ž . horizons long enough, one of two circumstances arises first: i either the weak firm is able but unwilling to deter entry because the losses that it would have to incur outweigh the positive rent it would eventually earn, or Ž .
ii the strong firm's incumbency rent is so high that the weak firm is unable to deter entry. In such games, despite being the initial leader, the weak firm is better off exiting the market. The strong firm enters and maintains in the long run. This leads directly to the selection property, which is the paper's central result. 
PROPOSITION 2. In the unique perfect equilibrium of any asymmetric entry Ž . game ⌫ W with N G M, the weak firm exits and remains out after at most

S S
Consider now a game of length N ) M and let N s Q и M q R, with Ž . R -M. In terms of its subgame perfect equilibria, the game ⌫ i can be N Ž . analyzed as an introductory game ⌫ i followed by Q independent games Ž .
Ž . the same token, one gets that ⌫ i is played as ⌫ i , followed by Q is, an N-stage game is played as a sequence of independent one-shot entry games. With smaller asymmetries, the weak incumbent can maintain in short games. However, it eventually has to give up incumbency in longer Ž . games, except for an introductory phase of less than M stages . Once the weak firm has exited, such games are played as a sequence of independent Ž . games ⌫ S , in each of which the strong firm maintains using its OEPP M Ä M 1 4 x , . . . , x . That is, once the strong firm is in the market, it follows a S S cyclical OEPP. By backward induction, this complete information game is played as a sequence of independent games. During the R first stages, the Ž . weak incumbent deters entry just as in ⌫ W , anticipating that in stage R Q и M the strong firm will enter. Conversely, the strong firm is certain to enter in stage Q и M. Its prize for entering earlier would thus merely be incumbency in some of the R first stages. By definition of the weak firm's OEPP, the prize is not worth the entry cost. Second, the firms' average equilibrium profits reflect their relative efficiency. Since the weak firm cannot maintain in more than a given Ž . finite number of stages, its average profit converges to zero when the horizon goes to infinity. Instead, the strong firm's average profit converges has become as efficient as the strong one and can maintain over games of arbitrarily long horizons.
An Extension with Infinite Horizon
The analysis of competition between asymmetric firms cannot be extended directly to an infinite horizon setting. In the finite horizon game, the strong firm's OEPP is cyclical; such a policy does not converge when the length of the game goes to infinity. Yet, in many situations of economic relevance, efficiency asymmetries between firms are only temporary. This is the case, for example, when the efficiency advantage comes from a patented innovation; when the patent expires, all firms in the industry can use the most efficient technology. Such situations can be analyzed through a simple extension of our basic model. Moreover, a similar issue of 6 Note that this would not be the case with multiple strong entrants because these would enter as early as possible so as to preempt the market.
7 Formally, the functions¨, C , and d converge uniformly to the functions¨, C and respective OEPPs of the weak and the strong firms during the asymmetric ϱ Ž . ϱ Ž . phase of ⌫ W and ⌫ S . These are determined along the lines exposed N N in 3.2, except that the incumbent in the symmetric endgame earns a rent Ž l . Ž . C x . Accordingly, the system extending system 3 is
LEMMA 3. For all n G 0 for which x n and x n are defined, the following
Proof. By induction.
Step 0. x 0 s x 0 s x l by assumption.
W S S
Step n q 1. Suppose that the inequalities hold until rank n:
where we used respectively¨-¨, the inequalities hold until rank n, W S Ž k . which ensure that each term¨x is negative, and C F C . It follows . As a consequence of Assumptions E E, one establishes Ž n . Ž n . the existence of an n such that¨x -0 -¨x . Considering system
nЈ 3 , it is straightforward to prove by induction that for nЈ ) n, when x is
game of given horizon and suppose that the weak firm must lose money in the early stages to maintain in later ones. Then, in a game with a longer horizon, the weak firm must lose strictly more money to remain the incumbent. ϱ Ž . In ⌫ W , the selection result derives from the same mechanism, except N that the weak incumbent would lose money even within a single period of ϱ Ž . asymmetry. In ⌫ W , the weak incumbent has to deter the entry of a 1 Ž l . strong firm aiming at an incumbency rent C x earned in the symmetric
S S
endgame. This means charging x l which is below the weak incumbent's S average cost policy. It could be worth making a bounded loss so as to be Ž l . the incumbent when the symmetric endgame starts and earn a rent C x .
S S Yet, with long phases of asymmetry, such losses would accumulate and eventually outweigh the rent, making entry prevention unprofitable or impossible for the weak firm. Here, Assumption D D is not necessary to find the existence of a minimal duration of asymmetry such that the weak incumbent is forced to lose money to preserve incumbency.
THREE EXAMPLES
This section illustrates how¨and C are constructed in specific economic contexts. It emphasizes the selection result in three modelsᎏprice competition with almost homogeneous products, quantity competition, and the renewal of productive capacitiesᎏwhich have been previously analyzed in the rent dissipation perspective only. In each of them, firms differ in their fixed costs. Assumption E E is straightforward to check. Assumption D D, which is central to our analysis of the rent dissipation and selection results, is given particular attention.
Limit Pricing
Ž . This first example is a direct adaptation of Ponssard 1991 to a sequential move setting. active and the duopoly demand function for firm i is
If by contrast the price differential is large, the firm with the lowest price has a monopoly demand:
Ž .
These definitions generate a piecewise continuous, kinked demand curve. With large enough, the demand goes entirely to the low price firm, except for very small price differences. The natural monopoly structure of the market pertains to the existence of fixed costs, F and F , incurred in 1 2 case of production. The monopoly flow profit is
With large enough fixed costs and a large enough , the Stackelberg Ž . one-stage game has the first mover the incumbent cornering the market with a limit-pricing policy. Leadership and incumbency refer here to an idea of consumers' switching costs. To steal the consumers from the current incumbent and become leader in the next period, the entrant has to undercut its rival by a strict margin depending on the price charged by 9 For detailed calculations, which are omitted here, the reader is referred to Ponssard Ž . 1991 . Ponssard analyzes the simultaneous moves version of this game. He finds two continuums of equilibria, depending on which firm is incumbent. A criterion based on forward induction selects the two Stackelberg equilibria. The criterion, however, does not trivially extend to asymmetric games. the incumbent. Precisely, the price p minimizing firm j's entry cost 
Capacity as an Entry Barrier
Quantity competition is a most natural setting to investigate issues of entry-deterrence. Interpreted as a capacity, a quantity has the value of a Ž . credible commitment to an entry-preventing behavior Dixit, 1979 . In the simplest version, firms compete a la Cournot, with a linear demand. Firm Ž . i 's profit stage payoffs is a function of its capacity decision, k , as well as
The market is assumed to have a natural monopoly structure due to large fixed costs of production, F and F . As a firm's revenue is necessarily Maskin and Tirole analyze an infinite horizon, dynamic version of a similar game with symmetric firms. In their model, the two firms move in alternance and their decisions commit them for two periods. Investigating the Markov perfect equilibria of this game, in which each firm reacts only to its rival's last move, they prove that the rent dissipation property Ž obtains: the equilibrium strategies are trigger strategies the firm produc-. ing nothing or a large quantity depending on its rival's last move and the 10 Ž . large with respect to the fixed costs is needed to ensure that the two firms cannot profitably share the market. Also, with small, each firm has a limited market power. As a result, the incumbent might be better off accommodating rather than deterring entry.
trigger quantity converges to the average cost policy as discounting decreases.
However, the same Markov equilibrium approach used for asymmetric Ž . firms does not lead to the selection property Lahmandi-Ayed et al., 1996 . Instead, the less efficient firm maintains indefinitely and, furthermore, earns the same total incumbency rent as the most efficient firm would; while its production cost is greater, its equilibrium trigger quantity is smaller than that of the efficient firm. This result is counterintuitive because the less efficient firm's OEPP is less constrained than that of the more efficient one. It is thus worthwhile to consider a finite horizon model, as discussed in Section 2. Are the rent dissipation and selection properties obtained naturally?
Unlike for price competition, entry deterrence consists in inflating Ž . capacities. Hence, we should check that¨, C, and¨q C have monotonicities opposite to those in Assumptions B B, C C, and D D.
11 The monopoly stage payoff can be written
Ž . minimizes its entry cost by maximizing its short-run revenue and choosing Ž . Ž . k k s 1 y k r2. Its entry cost is then
In the case of symmetric firms, the function¨q C can be written 2 q C k sk 1 yk y 1 yk r4s 1 yk 5ky1 r4, Ž . must cover its fixed cost. As long as the fixed cost is in 0.24, 0.25 , the rent dissipation and selection properties naturally hold. However, as soon as the fixed cost is below 0.24, even the rent dissipation property does not obtain in this model.
It is instructive to contrast the price and the quantity models in terms of their strategic variables and the corresponding reaction functions for an entrant. The first example deals with strategic complements for which the entry price amplifies the incumbent's price; to a low price by the incumbent corresponds an even lower entry price. The entry cost varies widely with the incumbent's price. By contrast, the second example deals with strategic substitutes; the optimal policy to enter is not very sensitive to the Eaton and Lipsey study entry-prevention through premature renewal of capital. The strategic variables are the dates at which the firms set up new plants. They characterize the incumbent's OEPP in the case of symmetric firms and show that the corresponding premature renewal of plants leads to rent dissipation when the discounting is low enough. In the limit, the incumbent renews its plant as soon as it has covered its fixed cost of installation. Their rational expectations argument, which leads to the 12 Ž . Lahmandi-Ayed 1995 considers a model in which the entrant becomes the next leader only if it sets a capacity higher than that of the incumbent. This ''escalation rule'' restores the Ž Ž . . desired results. Indeed, it aligns the entrant's decision on the incumbent's k k s k and
ensures that the entry cost varies as much as the monopoly profit does when the incumbent increases its capacity.
classical recursive formulation, cannot be extended as such to the case of asymmetric firms. In order to examine the selection issue, we consider instead the finite horizon version of their capital replacement game. By a finite horizon N it is meant that only a fixed, finite number N of equipment can be set up in the industry as a whole and that firms compete for the installment of these plants. 13 For N s 2, the first equipment can be replaced only once, either by the incumbent or by its rival. In particular the last equipment will be exploited until the end of its natural lifetime. As opposed to the two previous models, no other assumption than the fixed number of plants is needed to directly set the game as a sequential move game with endogenous leadership which can be solved within our framework.
Suppose that a firm renews its plant at date t . The new plant duplicates 
Ž . i i m i i
It is increasing in t . Given a planned renewal date t , the entry-costi i minimizing strategy for firm j consists in preempting the next plant, i.e. to set it up immediately prior to t . Since the previous incumbent's equipment i still has H y t units of time to go, firm j has to share the market with i firm i during these H y t units and earns the duopoly flow of revenue .
i d
The entry cost is defined as the loss in revenue due to the initial duopoly phase:
C t s y H y t .
Ž . Ž .Ž . The phenomena underlying the rent dissipation and selection results are best captured in the case s 0. Entry barriers coincide with premature d renewal of capital, provided that, once the plant is set up, the incumbent is committed to be in the market until its obsolescence. Then, renewing 13 Interpreting a finite horizon as a situation in which there is a fixed, finite number of plants to be set up simplifies the analysis. An alternative would be to consider a limited time horizon, which would lead to the same type of results, although at the cost of a considerable analytical and notational burden.
capital prematurely implies that the entrant always faces a minimal residual phase of duopoly competition if it enters, which partly destroys its revenues. The entry-preventing policy forces the incumbent to reduce the exploitation period of each plant. With symmetric firms and s 0, the d rent dissipation is readily obtained since the incumbent does not earn any Ž . profit on each new plant. Indeed, the function C q¨is constant and the sequence of renewal dates is stationary:
With asymmetric firms, Lemma 2 shows that the less efficient firm has to Ž renew at an even more rapid pace in order to maintain. It then loses more . than a fixed amount of money on each new plant. Incumbency can be profitable to the less efficient firm only if the profit earned over the first plant outweighs the additional loss incurred for all subsequent plants. Obviously, for a large enough number of plant renewals, this cannot be the case and the less efficient firm is better off exiting; the more efficient firm is selected as the long-run incumbent.
Ž . Moreover, Steinmetz 1996 shows that the rent dissipation and selection results might hold as well for positive values of , i.e. in the case of a less d destructive duopoly competition. This illustrates in particular that Assumption D D is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition.
CONCLUSION
In dynamic entry-deterrence contexts, whenever firms are asymmetric, selection is the very first economic property to investigate. This article provides sufficient conditions for this property to hold, using a simple game theoretic framework. It also shows that these conditions lead quite naturally to the already investigated rent dissipation property in the special case of symmetric firms. Thus this article constitutes an extension of the existing literature on entry. Three specific examples are examined which illustrate the generality of our framework and, in particular, the context in which our sufficient conditions can arise naturally. They also point out that these conditions are not necessary ones.
In order to focus on the selection question, several issues have been left aside. The main short-coming of our approach may be the assumption of a finite horizon. While the selection property arises very naturally in such a setting, some equilibrium features are not very appealing, especially the cyclicity of the strong firm's OEPP. Hence a first potential avenue of future research would be to formulate a solution for general infinite horizon games which captures our effects. One can hope, in particular, to reconcile the Markov equilibrium approach with ours. Another line of future research is to extend the analysis to more general situations. For instance, the results should carry through to natural oligopolies. The process of leadership transfer has been modelled in a reduced form. It could be developed and refined, e.g., to describe the incumbent's exit decision. Finally, new interesting effects, such as reputation building, arise when firms have private information about their level of efficiency. The formal analysis of these questions is left for future research.
